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Niger SF attack: Back Channel commentary

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Flyin6:
Subject: FW: [Non-DoD Source] Fwd: Niger Ambush & Johnson

An unofficial back channel.
 
 
This just in from Special Activities Division (SAD) source in USG. Worth a read.
 
From my associates in the community, I have gotten the two stories currently floating around.  One is what appears to have happened, and the other is the Pentagon/USG Cover-Your-Ass (CYA) version.
 
The Pentagon CYA version continually changes, starts/stops, and is a massive blame game.  To them, it is obviously the A-Team’s fault and error on a ‘routine’ training and advisory mission in Niger.  The narrative is that the A-Team, combined with Nigerien forces were out on a routine training advisory mission when (allegedly got sloppy) and ambushed (lucky chance) by a pro-Al Queda (ALQ) force.
 
My SF associates tell another version, and one I tend to believe.  The American A-Team had two, possibly four non-SF personnel (SGT La David Johnson being one of them).  The non-SF support folks were support weenies (drivers, supply & mechanics).  So, you had an A-Team of approximately 12 – 16 personnel; only 12 being Special Forces.  The A-Team was leading and advising a Nigerien Army force of approximately 30 Nigerien soldiers.  Their mission was not a routine training and advisory, but a joint US-Nigerien mission to seek out High Value Targets (HVTs); I.e., Nigerien ALQ leaders or forces.  The mission was conducted near Tonga-Tonga, along the Mali-Nigerien border; a very hot and active AO.
 
The story goes that they had conducted their mission and were returning when they stopped at a local village to do a ‘meet & greet’ - being seen and obtaining local intelligence.  It is alleged that the village headman and others mysteriously (and suspiciously) detained the US/Nigerien force well after the time they wished to depart.  Could the headman and others be in cahoots with the local guerrillas/ALQ using the delay to allow time to prepare an ambush?  Nobody knows, but French/Nigerien force have allegedly arrested and taken the village headman and others away for interrogation.
 
Leaving this particular village and heading back to their base camp, the joint A-Team/Nigerien Army force was indeed ambushed by a heavily armed ALQ band numbering approximately 50 fighters.  The ALQ band had small arms, machineguns and RPGs, and possibly mortars.  For some reason, approximately half of the US/Nigerien force was allowed to pass through the ambush killzone before the ambush was sprung, trapping the rear half.  Immediately after the ambush was initiated, the first half swung around to engage the ambushers and save the rear half.  It is then alleged that except for those already dead or wounded, all of the Nigerien soldiers bugged out and left the Americans to fight ALQ all by themselves.  Two groups, roughly 6-8 Americans per group fighting for their lives alone against a superior ALQ force.
 
Airstrikes were requested as the Americans fought on.  Several French Mirage fighters responded, but refused to engage citing poor weather, rough terrain and an inability to differentiate friend from foe.  American SF requested ‘danger close’ support and attempted to talk the CAS in, but the French Mirages alleged continued to refuse to engage.  Meanwhile, a French Quick Reaction Force (QRF) was contacted and on their way to the fight.
 
The Americans fought until relieved by the arrival of the French QRF.  The ALQ force broke contact and melted away.  Meanwhile, the French QRF searched the immediate vicinity and conducted MEDEVAC operations.  Three American Special Forces soldiers were either dead or would later die from wounds, several others wounded and one American support soldier (Johnson) missing.
 
Johnson’s body was found near the ambush 48 hours later.  At present, nobody is sure if Johnson broke and ran like the Nigeriens, or was captured and then executed by the ALQ.  Either way, he wasn’t in the two small Special Forces perimeters when the French QRF arrived.
 
Such things happen.  People get separated, captured or bug-out in panic.  Johnson was a driver.  For whatever reason, his failure to remain with the other Special Forces soldiers cost him his life.
 
And that is what I have been told about the action in Niger.  Basically 12-16 American soldiers abandoned, split in half and fighting to join together against a superior and more heavily armed enemy.  And the majority survived.
 
FYI

cj7ox:
This narrative make a lot of sense. Thanks for sharing, Don.

Flyin6:

--- Quote from: cj7ox on October 23, 2017, 03:32:22 PM ---This narrative make a lot of sense. Thanks for sharing, Don.

--- End quote ---
Still a shame that any of our guys get hurt...

KensAuto:

--- Quote from: Flyin6 on October 23, 2017, 04:21:14 PM ---Still a shame that any of our guys get hurt...

--- End quote ---
The only comfort I get from it, is knowing that those guys probably took out a ***t load of heathens before they scattered like the cowards they are..
..May they (SF) rest in peace

Flyin6:
Oh you better believe it bro.

I once made it a study after one memorable operation during Desert Storm. I studied the huge differential in body counts between US soldiers and our enemies. Script does not read well for anyone in history that ever came up against us.

The highest kill ratio I ever read about was 2700:1. Cost them nearly three thousand xxxxxxx to bag one single US Infantryman. Obviously not always that good,
and, know what that means?


We have room for improvement! ;-)

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